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FU Notes

1. Main themes:

From *sense universals* (observable properties, available to sensuous immediacy, i.e. noninferentially) to *theoretical entities* (in the allegory, “forces”), which are *only* accessible inferentially.

a) Status of *theoretical identities*: main opponents are instrumentalism and invidious Eddingtonian realism. The complaint about them is that they both conflate the observational/theoretical distinction with the appearance/reality distinction. They just each line them up differently.

Sellars obviously opposes instrumentalism. But Is the scientia mensura a tacit endorsement of IER?. Only if one conflates distinction between observable and theoretical objects with that between manifest and scientific image. Sellars does. But one should not. Greeks and others posited unobservables (though perhaps only contingently unobserved) and science observes things in seriously theory-laden vocabulary.

Lesson: the distinction between observable and theoretical entities is *methodological* (epistemological), not *ontological*. They are not different kinds of thing.

b) Status of *laws of nature* (Newton's invention: grammatical status as "Neckties will be worn in the Officers' mess."). Not superfacts. Q: So, what are they? A: Making explicit something implicit in the existence of determinate facts. Kant on categories as framework explicating. Kant-Sellars thesis about modality (coming: KS thesis about normativity, and it's relation to KS modal thesis).

c) Driving all this: *holism*. Kant from concepts to judgements. So: facts. (objective idealism on the relations between them.). From facts/judgements to laws. The Concept: doxastic- cognitive and inferential commitments, and objective correlates. (Relations between these will be topic of transition to SC.)

d) Final question is: How does the concern with holism (Hegel's invention--not the term, which is due to South African Jan Smuts in his 1926 book *Holism and Evolution*.) motivate the concern with relation between objective and subjective?

e) 34 'graphs in FU: not enough for doing all this.

f). The key idealist move--the key to the drawing of idealist conclusions for H in the PG--compare Ks argument in TD from role of sensuous intuition--is that connecting *law* to *explanation*. I want to say one can't understand what one is doing in endorsing a statement of law without understanding its role in explanations. C.f. Modal KS thesis.

g) H has views about sensibility=immediacy.

What is immediate for understanding consciousness is different from what is immediate for empirical consciousness understanding itself as sense-certainty or as perceiving. The immediacy in question is not *sensuous* immediacy, the immediacy of what is noninferentially *observable*, but the immediacy of what is *thinkable*, what is graspable by being placed in a conceptual space, articulated by relations of material consequence and incompatibility (mediation and determinate negation). It is in this sense that the play of forces is immediate for Understanding: it is a set of actualities interacting according to modal relations of necessity, possibility, and impossibility in virtue of which it is *conceptually* articulated and so *immediately* graspable by empirical consciousness conceived of as understanding, that is, as grasping thinkables precisely in virtue of their standing in just this sort of relation to other thinkables.

But his idealism stems from views about *modality*--at the center of K's idea of the categories. This is a view not on contemporary offer--even after all 3 waves of the modal revolution. (Q: Is Lewis-style analytic metaphysics a fourth?)

h) The first supersensible world (FSW): calm realm of laws.

The second supersensible world (SSW) = First Inverted World (FIW).

The third supersensible world (TSW) = Second Inverted World (SIW) = Infinity.

1. Status of F=ma (Newton’s second law) as α) definitional of force and mass, or β) a synthetic claim.

In the law of motion, e.g., it is necessary that motion be split up into time and space, or again, into distance and velocity. Thus, since motion is only the relation of these factors, it—the universal—is certainly divided *in its own self*. But now these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not in themselves express this origin in a One; they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another, space is thought of as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity…and thus are not related to one another through *their own essential nature*. [*PhG* 153]

His response begins with the idea that understanding the sense in which force and mass are distinct but necessarily related by Newton’s second law requires thinking about how statements of the law function in *explanation*, to begin with, in *inference*.

[T]he law is, on the one hand, the inner, *implicit* in-itself [Ansichseiende] being, but is, at the same time, inwardly differentiated…this inner difference still falls, to begin with, only within the Understanding, and it is not yet posited *in the thing itself*. It is, therefore, only its *own* necessity that is asserted by the Understanding; the difference, then, is posited by the Understanding in such a way that, at the same time, it is expressly stated that the difference is not a *difference belonging to the thing itself*. This necessity, which is merely verbal, is thus a recital of the moments constituting the cycle of the necessity. The moments are indeed distinguished, but, at the same time, their difference is expressly said to be *not* a difference of the thing itself, and consequently is immediately cancelled again. This process is called “explanation.” [Erklären] [*PhG* 154]

The claim that the objective pole of the intentional nexus cannot properly be understood apart from an understanding of the subjective pole, and so of the whole intentional nexus marks a decisive move in the direction of Hegel’s idealism.

j) The principal lesson we are to learn from the final experience of understanding consciousness is that this holistic structure of identity and difference that results from this progressive process of making explicit what is implicit in empirical consciousness is the structure of *self*-consciousness. It is this discovery that the key to understanding empirical consciousness lies in self-consciousness that motivates for us the expository narrative transition from the *Consciousness* chapter to the *Self-Consciousness* chapter.

The argument of the closing passages of *Force and Understanding* has three phases. It starts with a characterization of the lessons to be learned from consideration of the final form of the supersensible world understanding takes itself to confront: the inverted world. The second phase consists of remarks about the structure of identity in and through difference that Hegel calls “infinity.” The concluding phase is the claim that we can see (though it cannot yet) that in conceiving its object on the model of such an infinite structure, understanding consciousness has put itself in a position to recognize itself in its object—that it has actually become a form of consciousness that does not merely presuppose self-consciousness, but *is* a form of self-consciousness.

From the idea, then, of inversion, which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the supersensible world, we must eliminate the sensuous idea [Vorstellung] of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element; and this absolute Notion of the difference must be presented and understood [darstellen und auffassen] purely as inner difference…

Certainly, I put the ‘opposite’ here, and the ‘other’ of which it is the opposite there; the ‘opposite’, then, is on one side, is in and for itself without the ‘other’. But just because I have the ‘opposite’ here in and for itself, it is the opposite of itself, or it has, in fact, the ‘other’ immediately present in it. Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched [übergriffen] the other world and has it within it; it is for itself the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as inner difference, or difference in its own self, or difference as an infinity. [160].

What is wrong with the inverted world [verkehrte Welt] is not the inversion, but the reification of it into a world—just as what was wrong with the conception of a supersensible “calm realm of laws” was the reification of laws into superfacts.

[O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior,* just *different.*[In “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities,” in H. Feigl, M. Scriven,and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,* vol. II (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1957), §79.]

The alternative Hegel is recommending in place of descriptivism is a distinctive kind of *expressivism*. Modal claims, it is true, do not simply describe the actual. (Laws are not superfacts.) But that is not because they describe something else. It is because they express something implicit in the actual. They express the exclusive differences in virtue of which any actual state of affairs is the state of affairs it is.

Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in one way or another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of that determinateness, this no doubt has been all along the soul of all that has gone before…but it is as ‘*explanation*’ that it first freely stands forth… [*PhG* ¶163].

At this final stage, “what is, for the Understanding, an object in a sensuous coverning, is *for us* in its essential form as a pure Notion.” For that reason we can see that “the Understanding experiences only *itself*,” not something experienced as other than itself. [*PhG* ¶165].

Since this Notion of infinity is an object for consciousness, the latter is consciousness of a difference that is no less immediately cancelled; consciousness is for its own self, it is a distinguishing of that which contains no difference, or self-consciousness. [*PhG* ¶164].

2. Word of the day: “semantogenic”. But this focuses too much on determinateness of *meanings*. Hegel’s point is about determinateness *as such*, beginning with the determinateness of objective states of affairs.

3. The philosophy of science concerns Hegel raises in FU—

i) status of **theoretical entities** (instrumentalism vs. invidious Eddingtonian realism), and

ii) the status of **laws** (as superfacts, as analytic vs. synthetic), come up as responses to moves Kant had made at least 5 times:

a) By Kant himself, in the the *Nachlass*, as read by Eckart Förster.

b) By Hegel, here.

c) By neo-Kantians, especially the young Hermann Cohen and Wilhelm Windelband.

d) By the Vienna Circle. Carnap (like Cassirer—and for that matter, Heidegger) was a student of the neo-Kantians (Bruno Bauch, Frege’s colleague).

e) By Sellars.

All of them thought of themselves as reading Kant. The latter two did not associate these points with Hegel, though they were in fact following the same path out of Kant that he did.